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INTRODUCTION
Controversies over Confederate monuments and other Confederate iconography
have roiled the country in recent years. Perhaps most well-known, in August 2017,
violent white supremacists, ostensibly rallying to protest the proposed removal of
statues of two Confederate generals, Robert E. Lee and Thomas J. "Stonewall"
Jackson, took over the center of Charlottesville, Virginia.
2 One of their fellow
travelers murdered a counter-protestor, Heather Heyer.
3 The legal and political fights
over Confederate iconography have resulted in literal fights over the content of the
public square.
In the parlance of constitutional law, publicly owned and maintained Confederate
monuments are "government speech."4 That moniker is more than a factual
statement identifying the title holder of a monument or the provenance of an
expressive act. "Government speech" is a conclusion that does a great deal of work
in insulating Confederate monuments from constitutional review.
But what is "government speech" exactly? This Article explores this question
through the lens of recent legal challenges involving Confederate monuments. Those
challenges help illustrate three distinctions on which the concept of "government
speech" is built: the distinctions between "speech" and "conduct," between "public"
and "private," and between "coerced" and "non-coerced" speech.
These distinctions should be familiar. They have often invited skepticism. In
arguing that such distinctions are unstable (and perhaps untenable), my view is not
so different from that of others who have previously trod this ground.'
Conflicts over Confederate monuments, however, are useful in illustrating these
points. The first distinction -between speech and conduct-prevents courts from
2 Benjamin Wallace-Wells, The Fight Over Virginia's Confederate Monuments, NEW YORKER (Nov.
27, 2017), https://www.newyorker.com/magazine/2017/12/04/the-fight-over-virginias-confederate-
monuments [https://perma.cc/PZM9-SJJG].
John Edwin Mason, History, Mine and Ours: Charlottesville's Blue Ribbon Commission and the
Terror Attacks ofAugust 2017, in CHARLOT'ESVILLE 2017: THE LEGACY OF RACE AND INEQUITY 19, 19
(Louis P. Nelson & Claudrena N. Harold eds., 2018); see also Sheryl Gay Stolberg & Brian M. Rosenthal,
Man Charged Aier White Nationalist Rally in Charlottesville Ends in Deadly Violence, N.Y. TIMES (Aug.
12, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/08/12/us/charlottesville-protest-white-nationalist~html
[https://penna.cc/3DBW-V2BJ].
' See Pleasant Grove City v. Summum, 555 U.S. 460, 467-68, 470 (2009) ("A government entity has
the right to 'speak for itself' '[lit is entitled to say what it wishes,' and to select the views that it wants to
express. Indeed, it is not easy to imagine how government could function if it lacked this freedom."
(citations omitted)).
' On the speech/conduct distinction, see STANLEY FISH, TIIERE IS NO SUCti THING AS FREE SPEECH
(AND IT'S A GOOD THING, Too) 105 06 (1994); Frederick Schauer, Must Speech be Special?, 78 NW. U.
L. REV. 1284, 1284 (1983) [hereinafter Schauer, Must Speech]; Frederick Schauer, On the Distinction
Between Speech and Action, 65 EMORY L.J. 427 28 (2015) [hereinafter Schauer, On the Distinction]. On
the public/private distinction, see ROBERT L. HALF, FREEDOM THROUGH LAW: PUBLIC CONTROL OF
PRIVATE GOVERNING POWER vii viii (1952); Louis L, Jaffe, Law Making by Private Governments, 51
IARV. L. REV 201 (1937); Duncan Kennedy, The Stages of the Decline of the Public/Private Distinction,
130 U, PA. L. REV. 1349 (1982). On the coercion/non-coercion distinction, see J. Roland Pennock,
Coercion. An Overview, in COERCION I, 1 (J. Roland Pennock & John W. Chapman eds., 1972); Robert
L. I ale, Coercion and Distribution in a Supposedly Non-Coercive State, 38 POL. SCI. Q, 470 (1923):
Kathleen M. Sullivan, Unconstitutional Conditions, 102 IIARV. L, REV. 1413 (1989),
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appropriately weighing the discriminatory harms of Confederate iconography, in
large part because of the assumption that most constitutional restraints on
government apply to conduct and not to "mere" speech. The second
distinction-between public and private speech-also tends to insulate the
goverrnent's expressive conduct. If the government is speaking, it need not abide
by the neutrality requirements of the First Amendment; there is no necessity for the
government to be even-handed in its pronouncements. The public/private distinction
may also stand in the way of local governments that seek to remove their own
Confederate monuments but are barred by state laws that restrict such removal. In
these cases, are cities "private" or "public" speakers? Do they enjoy the same rights
as individuals and corporations to speak, or can the state dictate what the cities say?
The question of who is speaking when states and cities disagree also implicates
the third distinction-between coerced and non-coerced speech. Are local citizens
being coerced to speak by state laws mandating that cities maintain their Confederate
monuments? Taxpayers normally do not have the ability to contest the government's
myriad expressive activities; if they could, it has often been observed, government
could not function.6 Thus, coerced or "compelled" speech is a narrow category when
the government is funding or sponsoring it or when local governments are forced to
engage in it. But under recent Supreme Court precedent, compelled speech is a quite
capacious category when the government seeks to regulate "private" speech, even if
that regulation is incidental to some important government interest.
7
This Article begins by describing the ways that government speech doctrine
erects obstacles to the application of free speech and equal protection principles to
local Confederate monuments. It then proceeds to raise questions about the
speech/conduct, public/private, and coerced/non-coerced istinctions, showing how
these lines are drawn to achieve certain ends. Those ends are substantive; they reflect
judgements about value, not acknowledgements of some pre-existing intuitive
schema. The legal challenges to Confederate monuments help illustrate the
arbitrariness of these doctrinal fault lines.
The final part of the Article observes how the proliferation of doctrine sometimes
occludes the obvious interests at stake. The Confederate monuments that dot the
landscape are symbols of a treasonous, slave-holding regime erected to memorialize
and celebrate an imagined romantic past-the Lost Cause.' They have more recently
become touchstones for a rising white, Christian nationalism, fostered in part by a
President pursuing a politics of racial division and demonization.9 That monuments,
'See e.g., Pleasant Grove City, 555 U.S. at 467 68 ("A government entity has the right to 'speak for
itself.' '[1]t is entitled to say what it wishes,' and to select the views that it wants to express. Indeed, it is
not easy to imagine how government could function if it lacked this freedom." (citations omitted)).
' See Janus v. Am. Fed'n of State, Cty., and Mun. Emps., Council 31, 138 S. Ct. 2448, 2486 (2018),
See Amanda Lineberry, Standing to Challenge the Lost Cause, 105 VA. L. Rfiv. 1177, 1181 (2019).
'See Julie I Iirschfeld Davis et al., Trump Alarms Lawmakers with Disparagini' Words br laiti and
Africa, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 11, 2018), https:/nyti.ms/2EzkEQe [https://perma.cc/86L3-527E] (describing
Ilaiti and some African nations as "shithole countries"); Michael D. Shear & Julie Hirschfeld Davis,
Stoking Fears, Tnmp Defied Bureaucractv to Advance Immigration Agenda, N.Y. TIM,;ES (Dec. 23, 2017),
https://nyti.ms/2DCJqPP [https://perma.cc/3U96-3V8S] (declaring that immigrants to the United States
from Haiti "all have AIDS" and warning that as soon as Nigerian immigrants saw the United States, "they
would never 'go back to their huts' in Africa"); Donald J. Trump ((arealDonaldTmmp), TwITTER (July
2019--2020
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flags, and signs are expressive acts should not lead us to understate their power and
effects. There is no reason not to apply conventional approaches to discriminatory
government conduct to Confederate symbols, even though the "government speech"
doctrine serves to minimize and contain their constitutional import.
I. CONFEDERATE MONUMENTS AS GOVERNMENT SPEECH
More than a thousand Confederate monuments dot the landscape across the
United States, mostly (but not exclusively) in the South and Southwest.
0 Those
monuments vary in design. In some places, an anonymous Confederate
soldier-"Johnny Reb" stands with a rifle-or flag."
1 In other places, a plain obelisk
is inscribed with the names of Confederate dead.
12 More often, a Confederate general
or official is honored with a statue: Robert E. Lee, Thomas J. "Stonewall" Jackson,
and Jefferson Davis are popular. Monument Avenue in Richmond, Virginia-the
former capital of the Confederacy-includes statues of Lee, Jackson, Davis, and
J.E.B. Stuart.13 In the center of Charlottesville, Virginia, the site of the violent Unite
the Right rally that led to the death of a counter-demonstrator,
n there are three
statues: Lee, Jackson, and an anonymous Confederate soldier.
15 The latter two sit in
14, 2019, 8:27 AM), https://twitter.com/realDonaldTrump/status/ 150381395078000643
[https://perma.cc/VAG3-V4K2] (telling four minority congresswomen, all of whom are United States
citizens and only one of whom was born abroad, to "go back and help fix the totally broken and crime
infested places from which they came"); Full Transcript and Video: Trump 's News Conference in New
York, N.Y. TIMEs (Aug. 15, 2017), https:H/nyti.ms/2vBs7wD [https://perma.cc/NKL8-87D7] (declaring
that, as concerned the violence perpetrated by white supremacists and neo-Nazis against counter protesters
in Charlottesville, Virginia, there were "very fine people on both sides").
'0 Beth D, Jacob, Conftderate Monuments that Remain, 44 A.B.A. HUM. RTS. MAG., no. 1, 2019, at
9, 9, https://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/administrative/crsj/human-rights-magazine/hr-
v44n I.pdf [https://perma.cc/Z8CG-5TEH].
" See, e.g., Ben Finley, City Sues to Remove Confederate Monument, Citing Free Speech,
ASSOCIATED PRESS (Aug. 20, 2019), https://apnews.com/86c3fb6e348c46fe90f253
4 9 a
2
c
6 3 5al
[https://perma.cc/UK7M-SRZA] (describing Norfolk, Virginia's "Johnny Reb" statue); Jeff Weiner,
'Johnny Reb' Confderate Statue Rebuilt at Greenwood Cemetery, ORLANDO SENTINEL (Dec. 6, 2017,
4:45 PM), https://www.orlandosentinel.com/politics/os-ohnny-reb-statue-rebuilt-greenwood-cemetery-
20171206-story.html [https://perma.cc/DC4R-VG8G] (describing the relocation of Orlando, Florida's
"Johnny Reb" statue),
'2 See, e.g., Brakkton Booker, Confederate Monument Law Upheldby Alabama Supreme Court, NPR (Nov. 27,
2019, 4:46 PM), https://www npr.org/2019/11/27/783376085/confederate-monument-law-upheld-by-alabaiia-
supreme-court [https://perma.cc/V3PM-WY791 (describing Birmingham, Alabama's Confederate soldier and
sailor's obelisk); Conway Confederate Monument, ARK., https://www.arkansas.con/conway/points-
interest/conway-confederate-monument [https://perma.cc/K8X9-9MWD] (identifying a ten-foot obelisk in
Conway, Arkansas).
13 Monument Avenue Historic District, NAT'L PARK SERV.,
https://www.nps.gov/nr/travel!richmond/monumentavehd.html [https://perma.cc/WX6W-VZ8G].
"Stolberg & Rosenthal, supra note 3.
Louis P. Nelson, Object Lesson: Monuments and Memory in Charlottesville, BUILDINGS &
LANDSCAPES, Fall 2018, at 17, 18, 32. The Lee and Jackson statues may be removed in the near
future, however. While this Article was going to press, the Virginia General Assembly voted to
lift a state ban on removing war memorials. See Ned Oliver, A "Huge Step": General Assembly Says
Local Governments Can Remove Confederate Monuments, VA. MERCURY (March 8, 2020),
https://www.virginiamercury.com/2020/0
3
/08/a-huge-step-general-assembly-says-local-govemments-
can-vote-to-remove-confederate-monuments/.
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Courthouse Square, greeting citizens as they come to conduct official government
business.6 The Lee statue sits in a formerly segregated park also originally named
for the Confederate general.7 His statue faces the city's old library--now the local
historical society--and the city's new library, which used to be a federal courthouse
and post office. "
Confederate iconography has been a staple of the American landscape since the
Civil War. Most monuments were constructed between 1900 and the late 1920s,
however, as Southern states marked symbolically what they had been permitted to
achieve legally through Jim Crow. 9 It is helpful to remember that Plessy v.
Ferguson, in which the Supreme Court legitimated de jure racial segregation, was
decided in 1896.20
More recently, and especially after the election of Donald J. Trump, Confederate
symbols have become flashpoints in larger political and cultural struggles over race
and religion, white and non-white America, diversity, immigration, exclusion, and
inclusion. These debates have been accompanied by rising white supremacist
violence and an increasingly divisive and racialized political discourse.
2
1
In the aftermath of a number of violent episodes incited by white supremacists
who laid claim to Confederate iconography, some cities voted to remove their
Confederate monuments.22 Many more remain, however, and many former
Confederate states have adopted laws that prevent local governments from disturbing
them.23 The ostensible reason that white supremacists targeted Charlottesville in
August 2017 is that the city council voted to remove its Robert E. Lee statue.24 That
vote has been the subject of an over two-year legal challenge2 ' as Virginia's "statue
statute" permits individuals to bring a private right of action against local
governments that would seek to remove war memorials .
2
6
6 Nelson, supra note 15, at 18, 20, 32.
2
See id. at 28 29.
"Id. at 28 33.
'" Whose Heritage? Public Symbols of the Conrderacy, S. POVERTY L. CTR. (Feb. 1, 2019)
[hereinafter Whose Heritage?], https://www.splcenter.org/20190201/whose-heritage-public-symbols-
confederacy [https://perma cc/GFE4-LGN7].
2 
See generally 163 U.S. 537 (1896).
21 See sources cited supra note 9.
22 E.g., Corbett Smith, Dallas City Council Votes to Take Down Confederate War Memorial, DALL.
MORNING NEWS (Feb. 13, 2019, 8:32 PM), https://www.dallasnews.com/news/dallas-city-
hall/2019/02/13/dallas-city-council-votes-take-confederate-war-memorial [https://perma.cciQW64-
7E114]; Chris Suarez, Charlottesville City Council Votes to Remove Statue from Lee Park, DAILY
PROGRESS (Feb. 6, 2017), https://www.dailyprogress.com/news/local/charlottesville-city-council-votes-
to-remove-statuc-from- lee-park/article 2c4844ca-ece3-1 le6-a7bc-b7d28027df28.html
[https://perma.cc/W9PY-CCB2]; Daniel Victor, New Orleans City Council Votes to Remove Con/ederate
Monumnts, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 17, 2015), https:/inyti.ms/INVVwEo [https://perma.cc/QS9J-PPSI)].
2 See. eg., Alabama Memorial Preservation Act of 2017, ALA. CODE §§ 41-9-230 41-9-237
(LexisNexis 2019); N.C_ GEN. STAT. § 100-21 (2019).
24 Stolberg & Rosenthal, supra note 3.
25 Nolan Stout, CitY of Charlottesville to Appeal Decision in Cofelderate Statues Suit, DAILY
PROGRESS (Oct. 7, 2019), https://www.dailyprogress.com/news/local/city-of-charlottesville-to-appeal-
decision -in -confederate-statues-suit/article 6ec65034-7abc-57c7-a258-73be6603ff S html
[https://perma.cc/3DSK-JL9R].
26 VA. CODE ANN. § 15.2-181211 (2019). That statute has recently been amended by the Virginia
General Assembly to permit local governments to remove Confederate monuments, though the new
2019--2020
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Other legal challenges have proliferated. In Perry-Bey v. City ofNorfolk, a state
trial court rejected an equal protection challenge brought against the City of Norfolk,
Virginia for its Confederate monumentV-an enormous colunm capped by a
Confederate soldier.2 8
Immediately thereafter, the City of Norfolk itself brought a First Amendment
challenge in federal district court to the Virginia statute that requires the City to
maintain its monument.29 A state trial court vindicated a similar First Amendment
claim brought in an Alabama circuit court challenging the state statute that prevented
Birmingham from removing its Confederate memorial.
3° The Alabama court held
that the statute violated the city's speech and due process rights,
31 a decision that the
Alabama Supreme Court later reversed in a 9-0 decision.
3 2
These legal challenges raise questions about the reach of equal protection and
free speech doctrine in the context of government symbols. In the language of First
Amendment law, Confederate monuments are "government speech"
33 -reflecting
the basic fact that they are generally owned and maintained by the government, in
most cases by cities, counties, and towns. This doctrinal category, however, does not
simply identify the title holder of a monument or the origins of an expressive act.
Instead, "government speech" represents a conclusion about the nature of the
constitutional constraints on certain forms of expressive activity. "Government
speech" is not a fact but a doctrinal tool, and it is used mainly to constrain
constitutional review of certain kinds of expressive acts.3
4
The doctrinal category of "government speech" does three kinds of work. First,
denoting government communicative activity as "speech" mostly insulates it from
challenges under constitutional doctrines that apply to "conduct." The Establishment
Clause has been read to limit government speech that does not have a secular purpose
language will not take effect until July I, 2020. See Oliver, supra note 15. Other states still retain
restrictions on local removal. See Zachary Bray, Monuments of Folly: How Local Governments Can
Challenge Confederate "Statue Statutes," 91 TEMP. L. REV. 1, 10 (2018).
21 See Order Sustaining Demurrers at 5 6, Perry-Bey v. City of Norfolk, No. CLt9-3928 (Va. Cir.
Ct. Jul. 22, 2019).
25 Finley, supra note 11.
29 Complaint at 2, City of Norfolk v. Virginia, No. 2:19-cv-00436 (E.D. Va. Aug. 19, 2019).
'0 Order on Cross Motions for Summary Judgment at 9, State v. City of Birmingham, No. CV-17-
903426-MGG (Ala. Cir. Ct. Jan. 14, 2019).
31 See id.
12 State v. City of Birmingham, No. 1180342, 2019 Ala. LEXIS 132, at *37 38 (Ala. Nov. 27, 2019).
13 See Pleasant Grove City v, Summum, 555 U.S. 460, 470 (2009).
14 For a recent extensive treatment of government speech, see HELEN NORTON, TilE GOVERNMENT'S
SPEECH AND TIlE CONSTITUTION (2019). For a classic source discussing government speech, see MARK
G. YUDOF, WHEN GOVERNMENT SPEAKS: POLITICS, LAW, AND GOVERNMENT EXPRESSION IN AMERICA
(1983). An older literature addresses questions of the limits of government's political speech. See, e.g.,
Robert D. Kamenshine, The First Amendment s Implied Political Fstablishment Clause, 67 CALIF. L.
REV. 1104, 1113 (1979); Steven Shiffrin, Government Speech, 27 UCLA L. Rev. 565, 570, 606 (1980);
William W. Van Alstyne, The First Amendment and the Suppression of Warmongering Propaganda in
the United States: Comments and Footnotes, 31 L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 530, 540 (1966); Edward H.
Ziegler, Jr., Government Speech and the Constitution: The Limits of Official Partisanship, 21 B.C. L. REV.
578. 581 (1980). For a more recent discussion of government speech, see Frederick Schauer, Not Just
About License Plates: Walker v. Sons of Confederate Veterans, Government Speech, and Doctrinal
Overlap in the First Amendment, 2015 Sup. Ct. Rev. 265. On monuments and memorials, see SANFORD
LEVINSON, WRITTEN IN STONE 66 (1998),
Vol. 108
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or that advances religious favoritism, but that constraint has been narrowed
substantially in recent years."5 Equal protection or other constitutional challenges to
government symbols outside of the Establishment Clause have generally been
unsuccessful on the grounds that citizens do not have standing or a cognizable injury
to complain about government speech.316 Mere "offense," it is sometimes asserted, is
not constitutionally actionable.37
Second, denoting speech as "governmental" means that the government can
speak without abiding by the strictures of free speech neutrality.38 The government
cannot engage in viewpoint discrimination when it regulates private speech.39 But
when engaged in government speech, it may take a viewpoint and discriminate
against all others.4" Aside from the minimal side constraints of the Establishment
Clause, the government generally is permitted to say what it wants.
41
Third, categorizing an act as "government speech" permits the government to
engage in certain kinds of coercive expressive conduct but not in other kinds. The
government can compel citizens to pay for "government" speech with which they
disagree, though it cannot in some cases compel citizens to pay for other citizens'
"private" speech.42 So, too, the government can selectively fund favored speech and
" Richard Schragger & Micah Schwartzman, Establishment Clause Inversion in the Bladensburg
Cross Case, 3 AM. CONST. Soc'Y Sup. CT. REV. 21, 24 (2019); see Am. Legion v. Am. Humanist Ass'n,
139 S. Ct. 2067, 2090 (2019).
3" Two Circuits have considered constitutional challenges to the Confederate battle flag. The Fifth
Circuit held that the plaintiffs lacked sufficient tangible injury to establish standing. See Moore v. Bryant,
853 F.3d 245, 248, 250 (5th Cir. 2017). On two occasions, the Eleventh Circuit has held that plaintiffs did
not provide evidence of racially discriminatory effect or intent sufficient to survive summary judgment.
See Coleman v, Miller, 117 F.3d 527, 528. 530 (11 th Cir, 1997) (per curium); NAACP v. Ilunt, 891 F.2d
1555, 1565 66 (11 th Cir. 1990). l elen Norton notes two cases in which the Equal Protection Clause was
violated by government "expressive conduct." See NORTON, supra note 34, at 107 09. In Lombard v
Louisiana, the Court held that New Orleans city officials' statements that they would enforce the trespass
laws against sit-in demonstrators was akin to an ordinance enforcing segregation and, thus,
unconstitutional. Lombard v. Louisiana, 373 U.S. 267, 273-274 (1963). In Anderson v. Martin, the Court
struck down a state law that required candidates on the ballot to be identified by race, Anderson v. Martin,
375 U.S. 399, 401 02, 404 (1964).
.1 See Am. Legion, 139 S. Ct. at 2098 (Gorsuch, J., concurring).
3 See Pleasant Grove City, 555 U.S. at 467.
'9 Id. at 467, 469.
41 See id. at 467 68; see also Rust v. Sullivan, 500 U.S. 173, 194 (1991) ("To hold that the
Government unconstitutionally discriminates on the basis of viewpoint when it chooses to fund a program
dedicated to advance certain permissible goals, because the program in advancing those goals necessarily
discourages alternative goals, would render numerous Government programs constitutionally suspect.");
Nat'l Endowment for the Arts v. Finley, 524 U.S. 569, 598 (1998) (Scalia, J., concurring) ("It is the very
business of government to favor and disfavor points of view ... ")
"' This is somewhat overstated. As I lelen Norton argues, government conduct that is expressive has
been found on occasion to violate the Equal Protection Clause, see NORTON, supra note 34, at 106 10,
and officials' statements or communications can be grounds for other kinds of constitutional violations,
as in the context of police encounters.
42 See Pleas ant Grove City, 555 U.S. at 467 68.
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impose speech-related limitations on private actors who receive government
funding,43 but it cannot force a citizen to engage in compelled speech directly.44
Government speech doctrine is thus built on three important distinctions:
between speech and conduct, public and private, coercive and non-coercive. These
categories are unstable.4 5 Controversies over Confederate monuments help illustrate
why.
I. SPEECH AND CONDUCT
I begin with the speech/conduct distinction. Confederate iconography is
generally understood to be a form of symbolic "speech." But calling the
government's erection, maintenance, and (in some cases) celebration of Confederate
monuments, "speech" as opposed to "conduct" is already a conclusion about the
relative harms of such symbols. Speech doctrine relies on a distinct category of
activity called "speech," but that category is at the very least unstable, if not
indefensible.
A. "Speech " is an Unstable Category
The idea that "speech" is an unstable category has been recognized since the
Supreme Court first asserted that falsely shouting fire in a crowded theater is
unprotected conduct.4 6 The distinction between words that incite violence, constitute
a criminal conspiracy, or amount to false advertising and words that are "merely"
offensive, constitute a meeting of the American Nazi Party, or amount to "puffery"
is not natural or obvious.47 Whether burning a flag, a cross, or a draft card is speech
or conduct are all questions that have reached the Supreme Court;48 the Court's
conclusions have not been to everyone's satisfaction.49 Some time ago, Stanley Fish
provocatively asserted that "there's no such thing as free speech, and it's a good
thing, too.""0 What he meant is that .'[firee speech' isjust the name we give to verbal
behavior that serves the substantive agendas we wish to advance."51 In other words,
"when a court invalidates legislation because it infringes on protected speech, it is
not because the speech in question is without consequences but because the
41 See Rust, 500 U.S. at 192- 94.
4 See Janus v. Am. Fed'n of State, Cty., & Mun. Emps., Council 31, 138 S. Ct. 2448,2463 64 (2018);
United States v. United Foods, Inc., 533 U.S. 405, 410- 11 (2001); Wooley v, Maynard, 430 U.S 705,
706 (1977).
4- See discussion infa Parts I1 IV.
16 See Schenck v. United States, 249 U.S. 47, 52 (1919).
41 See. e.g., Brandenburg v, Ohio, 395 U.S. 444, 447 49 (1969) (incitement); Yates v. United States,
354 U.S. 298, 327 (1957) (subversive advocacy).
41 See generally Virginia v. Black, 538 U.S. 343 (2003) (cross burning); Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S.
397 (1989) (flag burning); United States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367 (1968) (draft card burning).
49 Cf FISH, supra note 5, at 114; Schauer, Must Speech, supra note 5, at 1296; Schauer, On the
Distinction, supra note 5, at 454.
5" FISti, supra note 5, at 102.
5 Id.
Vol. 108
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consequences have been discounted in relation to a good that is judged to outweigh
them."
52
Fred Schauer has more recently questioned the speech/conduct distinction along
similar lines.3 lie argues that a free speech principle has to explain why the state
should tolerate communicative actions that are likely to cause harm to third parties
when it would not tolerate non-communicative actions with equivalent
consequences.54 The assumption, which he contests, has to be that communicative
actions systematically cause less harm than do non-communicative actions.55 But
that cannot be right-or at least not empirically obvious. As Schauer observes, most
speech is harmless, but so is most action.56 When there are demonstrable, potential
harms of speech, equivalent to the demonstrable, potential harms of action, why
should the former receive more protection than the latter? Schauer concludes that it
is "hardly clear that respect for an agent's autonomy ought to lead other agents, or
the state, to tolerate autonomous communicative actions that are determined to be
likely to cause harm to third parties any more than they should tolerate autonomous
non-communicative actions whose consequences are equivalent."5 7
If "speech" and "conduct" are simply names we give to activities that have
already been assessed in relation to some harm, then calling government activities
"speech" suggests that we have already discounted the consequences of that activity.
Fish and Schauer do not oppose constitutional protections for certain kinds of
activities. In some cases, those activities will be called "speech" and, in some cases,
they will be called "conduct." They both contest, however, the assertion that
"speech" constitutes a unique category of human endeavor such that it can be
categorically exempt from regulation.58
This skepticism of a free-standing "free speech principle" can be applied to
government speech as well. Normally, the speech/conduct distinction is deployed
either to constrain government regulation of "speech" or to permit government
regulation of "conduct." But the distinction between speech and conduct also arises
when the government "speaks," and, in that context, the choice of category also
embeds substantive judgments about relative harms.
Indeed, when applied to the government's communicative actions, the
speech/conduct distinction seems to be even less defensible. When thinking about
the distinction between speech and conduct from the perspective of the citizen
resisting government regulation, the concept of "rights"-fundamental, human, or
natural-is doing a lot of work. Individuals (and maybe groups) generally have some
autonomy, dignitary, or other interest in having a sphere of activity (call it "speech")
that, despite its harms, is necessary for full human flourishing, or for the effective
'2 Id. at 106.
" See generallv Schauer, On the Disinc twin, supra note 5.
54 Id. at 439 49.
I d. at 438.
Id. at 452.
Id. at 453.
5' See Fisit, supra note 5, at 104; Schauer, On the Distinction, supra note 5, at 433-34.
2019-2020
KENTUCKY LAW JOURNAL
exercise of democratic self-government.59 That sphere of activity is certainly difficult
to define, and Schauer is undoubtedly correct that "autonomy" interests apply
equally to acts and speech.60 Nevertheless, if the best we can do is balance harms,
we might err on the side of individual human flourishing or, alternatively, democratic
accountability.6
Government, by contrast, does not have an interest in "flourishing" necessarily,
and whatever sphere of activity that the term "speech" captures does not serve as a
political check on the very government that is speaking. Of course, as many have
pointed out, government speech is necessary for effective governing.
6" Much of what
the government does involves communicative conduct of one sort or another. The
government could not operate unless it could "speak" from a certain perspective and
with a particular viewpoint. The government "speaks" through its laws and
proclamations, through its official communiques, through its elected officials,
through its bureaucrats, and through its symbols.
Nevertheless, we might wonder what interests are being protected when we
connote an activity that the government undertakes as "speech." In other words, we
can ask why "speech" should be treated differently from something called "conduct"
for constitutional purposes. Schauer asks this question of non-government speech.
He asks what makes speech "special" in relation to other human activities that have
consequences, and he is skeptical of the answer.6 3 In relation to government speech,
we should be too.
B. Confederate Iconography as "Speech" or "Conduct"
Consider Confederate iconography flags, monuments, and place names. There
is an initial question of categorization. Why is the government's building and
maintenance of a Confederate monument "speech" instead of "conduct"? Erecting a
statue (or tearing it down) is certainly a government act, even if expressive. When a
government official makes an official pronouncement or a declaration, that is speech,
but it is also an act. Consider a town that places a creche on the courthouse steps,
64
59 See generally ALEXANDER MEIKLEJOHN, FREE SPEECH AND ITS RELATION TO SELF-GOVERNMENT
(1948); CASS R, SUNSTEIN, DEMOCRACY AND THE PROBLEM OF FREE SPEECH (1993).
" Schauer, On the Distinction, supra note 5, at 453,
61 Schauer leaves open the possibility that while justifications for a free speech principle sounding in
individual autonomy do not adequately support a speech/conduct distinction, those justifications grounded
in democratic accountability might. See id. at 453 54.
61 See, e.g., Helen Norton, Government Speech and Political Courage, 68 STAN. L. REV. ONLINE 61,
61 62 (2015) (proposing a requirement hat the government expressly claim speech as its own both when
it is authorized and when it is delivered); Adam Winkler, Free Speech Federalism, 108 MICH. L. REV.
153, 153 55 (2009) (surveying core free speech cases and concluding that federal speech restTictive laws
are more likely to be upheld that similar laws enacted by state and local governments).
3 Schauer, Muvt Speech, supra note 5, at 1306; see also Leslie Kendrick, Free Speech as a Special Right, 45
PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 87, 117 (2017); cf Micah Schwartzman, What if Religion is Not Special?, 79 Cii. L. REV. 1351,
1352-55 (2012) (rejecting the idea that religion is "special" along similar grounds ).
64 Cty. of Allegheny v. ACLU, 492 U.S. 573, 578 79, 600-01 (1989) (prohibiting the display of a
creche in a county courthouse because it expressly endorsed a Christian message).
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or a city council that commissions sectarian prayers to open council sessions.6' These
activities are clearly speech, but also obviously acts. So, of course, is wearing an
armband.66 burning a flag,67 or holding up a sign.6' Acts and speech cannot be so
easily distinguished, especially in the symbolic realm.
69
One might focus instead on the harms of government expressive activity. One
might argue that what differentiates communicative (especially symbolic) and non-
communicative government conduct is that the former is mostly harmless. "Sticks
and stones may break my bones but words will never hurt me," goes the old
playground saying." This notion that "mere offense" is not actionable tracks the
fighting words distinction in free speech doctrine.7" The government cannot regulate
"merely" offensive speech without running afoul of the Free Speech Clause.7" By the
same token, when the government engages in "mere" speech, it, too, can do no harm.
But what if words do harm? Schauer certainly thinks that the harms of some
forms of speech are as real and as consequential as the harms of some forms of
action.7 And so does the law, which treats words as harmful in numerous
settingsY--consider hostile work environment claims in employment
discrimination, reputational torts, or criminal conspiracy. The law has done so in
constitutional cases as well. The Establishment Clause, for example, has long been
read to regulate the government's religious expression,75 either because the
government is absolutely disabled from speaking "religious truth" or because the
potential harms of government religious expression are too significant. The present
Court is somewhat hostile to that Establishment Clause limitation, 76 but has not
6 Town of Greece v. Galloway, 572 U.S. 565, 572 75,591 92 (2014) (upholding the use of sectarian
prayer before town meetings).
66 Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 505 -06 (1969).
67 Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397, 399, 406 (1989).
61 Carlson v. California, 310 U.S. 106, 112 13 (1940).
"9 See generallv United States v. Eichman, 496 U.S. 310 (1990) (invalidating the Flag Protection Act of 1989).
711 Michael C. Dorf, Same-Sex Marriage, Second-Class Citizenship, and Law's Social Meanings, 97
VA. L. REV. 1267, 1284 86 (2011).
" See Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15, 21 (1971).
72 Matal v. Tam, 137 S. Ct. 1744, 1763 (2(117) ("Giving offense is a viewpoint. We have said time
and again that 'the public expression of ideas may not be prohibited merely because the ideas are
themselves offensive to some of their hearers."' (quoting Street v. New York. 394 U.S. 576, 592 (1969)));
Diamond v. Charles, 476 U.S. 54, 62 (1986) ("The presence of a disagreement, however sharp and
acrimonious it may be, is insufficient by itself to meet Art. IlI's requirements."). Whether this is an
appropriate carve-out is a legitimate question, which I do not address here. See Frederick Schauer,
larmt(s) and the First Amendment, 2011 SUP. CT. REV. 81, 82 83.
" See Schauer, supra note 72, at 83, 96 97; Schauer, On the Distinction, supra note 5, at 428, 452;
cf MARY ANNE FRANKS, THE CULT OF rTIE CoNSTITUTION 116, 204 (2019) (describing the harms of
silencing, denigrating, and derogatory speech on women and minorities), Charles R. Lawrence III, l1h
Hollers Let Ilim Go: Regulating Racist Speech on Campus, 1990 DUKE L. J. 431,472-475 (arguing that
racist speech imposes unequal burdens on racial minorities).
7' Kenneth S. Abraham & G. Edward White, First Amendment Imperialism and the Constitutionalization of
Toit Liability 13 (Va. Pub. Law & Legal Theory Research Paper Series, No. 2019-44).
" E.g., David Cole, Faith and Funding: Toward an Expressivist Model of the Establishment Clause,
75 S. CAL. L. REV. 559, 563 (2002); B. Jessie IHill, Putting Religious Symbolism in Context: A Linguistic
Critique ofthe Endorsement Test, 104 MicH. L. REV. 491, 509 (2005), Mark D. Rosen, Establishment,
Expressivism. and Federalism, 78 Cii.-KENT L, REV. 669, 681 (2003)
7 Am. Legion v. Am. Humanist Ass'n, 139 S. Ct. 2067, 2080, 2087 (2019).
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rejected it outright. The government's religious speech is threatening enough to
warrant constitutional oversight.
Confederate monuments also do harm, even as the courts are hesitant to permit
"offended observers" to bring equal protection claims against them.77 But this raises
a question: Why is religiously-inflected speech more harmful than racially-inflected
speech? The answer is not at all clear, considering the salience of racial division in
the United States and the centrality of the Equal Protection Clause in our
constitutional culture.
78
Along these same lines, what is the difference between a government "act" of
racial classification and government "speech" that was originally intended to endorse
white supremacy? Historically, there was not much. The bulk of Confederate
monuments in the United States were erected around the turn of the twentieth century
and then again in the 1950s and 1960s, two periods when white majorities felt
threatened by rising black rights consciousness.7 9 The first period coincided,
unsurprisingly, with the overall legal effort to construct the Jim Crow state.
8 ° These
monuments were often erected in "whites only" parks, but also in front of
courthouses and other official government buildings, and were part and parcel of an
effort by white majorities to inscribe white supremacy into the law and landscape.
8"
African-Americans did not miss the message; in Charlottesville, Richmond, and
elsewhere, the monuments were accompanied by shows of white supremacist
strength in the form of Ku Klux Klan marches and ceremonial statements of white
racial superiority.2
Those who take the "sticks and stones" approach treat the government's conduct
and the government's speech very differently, arguing that, unlike mandated separate
facilities enforced by criminal and civil sanction, a Confederate monument can be
ignored. The monument need only mean what viewers care for it to mean; unless one
can point to some kind of material harm, speech is "harmless.,
83 Taken to its logical
conclusion, this account means that the government can make any verbal or symbolic
"7 Cy id. at 2098 (Gorsuch, J., concurring).
7' For arguments that religious speech is not special, see Schwartzman, supra note 63; Nelson Tebbe,
Government Nonendorsement, 98 MINN. L. REV. 648, 649-50 (2013).
7 Whose !teritage?, supra note 19.
1 Id,
See id.
12 In various speeches commemorating the unveiling of statues to Confederate generals Stonewall
Jackson and Robert E. Lee in Charlottesville, Virginia, the commentators all made their race-based
intentions clear. At the unveiling of the Jackson statue on October 18, 1921, Edwin Alderman, President
of the whites-only University of Virginia, celebrated Jackson as "a great Christian warrior .... [who]
passed without dispute, in the glory of unconquerable youth, into the inner circle of the soldier-saints and
heroes of the English race." Jackson Statue is Unveiled, DAILY PROGRESS, Oct. 19, 1921, at 3. Similarly,
at the dedication of the Lee statue on May 21, 1924, the event's keynote speaker was celebrated as a man
for whom "[elvery drop of the red blood that visits his heart and flows in his veins is CONFEDERATE
BLOOD." Introduction ofRev. M. Ashby Jones, D.D., DAILY PROGRESS, May 21, 1924, at 1. Subsequent
speakers celebrated Lee himself as "the South's ideal hero" who represented "all those traditions and
characteristics that constituted the moral greatness of the Old South at its best estate." Dr. tt. L. Smith
Presents Statue, DALLY PROGRESS, May 21, 1924, at 7. For an account of the unveiling of a Lee statue in
Richmond, Virginia, see The Moving of the Lee Statue, RicH. PLANET, May 10, 1890, at 1.
s See Am. Legion v. Am. I lumanist Ass'n, 139 S, Ct. 2067, 2098-2103 (2019) (Gorsuch, J., concurring).
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claim it wants regarding the inequality of the races, as long as it does not act in ways
that penalize or injure one race.
One might hear echoes of Plessy v. Ferguson here: the notion that a government
act that is facially neutral and does not materially injure blacks-i.e., the separation
of the races-is hurtful "solely because the colored race chooses to put that
construction upon it."84 This is absurd of course. Government acts, purposefully
communicative or not, convey messages of second-class status, create and reinforce
social hierarchies, influence both public and private discriminatory activity, and
cause psychological and stigmatic harms. The Court (and hopefully the
constitutional culture) has rejected Plessy."5 Indeed, the current Court has held that
government racial classification alone, even when the purpose and effect of that
classification is to advance integration as opposed to segregation, conveys the
constitutionally wrong message."'
This emphasis on the message of racial classification suggests another way in
which the speech/conduct distinction is untenable. Under expressivist theories of law
and morality, the only way to understand the rightness or wrongness of a government
act is to understand what message that act conveys.87 For expressivists, the
government's communicative conduct is all that matters: the constitutionality of any
government act is a function of that act's social meaning." On this account, the test
of a government act-whether a racial classification or a Confederate
monument-is whether the act conveys a denigrating message. Justice O'Connor's
mostly defunct endorsement est, which she applied to the government's religious
speech, takes this form as well. 9 In assessing the constitutionality of government-
sponsored religious symbols, O'Connor asked whether a religious symbol or practice
conveys a message to non-adherents of second-class or outsider status." Why would
we not also ask the same question of Confederate monuments?
Judges are hesitant to do so not because "speech" is special but because they have
already discounted the harms of the government's expressive conduct. Critics of
O'Connor's endorsement est simply do not believe that the Establishment Clause
should be understood as a substantive matter to regulate most forms of government
support or endorsement of religion, whether that support comes in the form of
government funding or government symbols.9 The speech/act distinction is less
14 Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537, 551 (1896).
8 Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483, 494 95 (1954).
wSee Parents Involved in Cmty. Sch, v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 551 U.S. 701, 720 (2007).
17 The literature on expressive harms is vast. See. eg, Elizabeth S. Anderson & Richard I. Pildcs, Expressive
Theories of Law: A General Restatement, 148 U. PA. L. REV. 1503 (2000); Simon Blackburn, Group Mind" and
Expressive tHarm, 60 MD. L. REV. 467 (2001); Doif, supra note 70; B. Jessie Hill, Expressive Harms and Standing,
112 HARV. L. REV. 1313 (1999), Richard 11. Pildes & Richard G. Niemi, Expressive ftarms, "Bizarre Dis'tricts, "
and Voting Rights: Evaluating Election District Appearances, After Shaw v. Reno, 92 MICH. L. REV. 483 (1993);
Michele Moody-Adams, Taking Expression Seriously: Equal Citizenship, Expressive Harm and Confederate
lconography (Oct. 18, 2018) (unpublished paper) (on file with the New York University School of Law Center for
Law and Philosophy). For a recent extended discussion, see Richard C. Schragger, Unconstitutional Government
Speech, 24 31 (Va. Pub. Law & Legal Theory Research Paper Series, No. 2019-56).
s' See Deborah I lellman, The Expressive Dimension of Equal Protection, 85 MINN. L. REV. I, 23 (2000).
"9 See Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668, 687 89 (1984) (O'Connor, J., concurring).
"I d. at 687 88.
9' See. e.g., Am. Legion v. Am. I tumanist Ass'n, 139 S. Ct. 2067,2098-2103 (2019) (Gorsuch, J., concurring),
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important than the judge's substantive views of the permissibility of religious
support, whether material or symbolic.
That being said, certain forms of government speech must certainly be
out-of-bounds constitutionally. It is possible that the courts would have nothing to
say if the White House sponsored an annual cross burning on the South Lawn. But
to assert as a general matter that cross burning does no harm or does less harm than
government "conduct" because it is "speech" seems implausible.
Certainly, recent events reveal that how government officials speak and what
they say has significant material consequences. Consider the tragic events in
Charlottesville. The speech/conduct distinction has been asserted as a defense by
those white supremacists who fomented the violence that accompanied the Unite the
Right rally held there in August 2017. The federal district court judge hearing a civil
rights case brought on behalf of those injured has thus far rejected the argument that
the rally organizers and participants were engaged in "mere" speech. He has held
instead that the facts alleged in the plaintiffs' complaint would amount to a
conspiracy to violate civil rights.
92
Nevertheless, the speech/conduct distinction stands in the way of an equal
protection challenge to the statues of Robert E. Lee and "Stonewall" Jackson that
adorn the city's central civic spaces and on behalf of which the Unite the Right
participants were rallying. Those statues still stand two years later,
93 and they still
cause harm.
1II. PUBLIC AND PRIVATE
The moniker "government speech" requires not just "speech" but also
"government." The decision to denote speech as "governmental" also tends to
insulate speech from constitutional review. The government has a great deal of
leeway to say what it wants when it is speaking.
Indeed, the drawing of the public/private line is often outcome determinative. If
speech is non-governmental, the government must act neutrally toward it. It can
neither favor certain viewpoints nor censor the speech.94 If speech is governmental,
however, the government need not act neutrally toward it. The government is
permitted to have its own viewpoint and is not required to give other speakers equal
time.
95
Like the speech/conduct distinction, the public/private distinction is unstable.
96
The conventional approach to dismantling state action has been to attribute
governmentality to ostensibly private transactions or to entities ostensibly private but
92 Sines v. Kessler, 324 F. Supp. 3d 765, 773 (W.D. Va. 2018).
"s Shannon Van Sant, Judge Blocks Removal of Confederate Statue that Sparked Charlottesville
Protest, NPR (Sept. 14, 2019, 6:40 PM), https://www.npr.org/2019/09/14/760876494/judge-blocks-
removal-of-confederate-statue-that-sparked-charlottesville-protest [https://perma.cc/TFY7-IJNB]. But
see Oliver, supra note 15 (reporting that the Virginia General Assembly has amended its statue statute to
permit local governments to remove Confederate monuments).
" Perry Edue. Ass'n v. Perry Local Educators' Ass'n, 460 U.S 37, 45-46 (1983).
15 Matal v. Tam, 137 S. Ct. 1744, 1757 (2017).
' See Kennedy, supra note 5, at 1349.
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affected with the public interest, such as corporations, in an effort to hold them
constitutionally accountable.
97
In the context of free speech doctrine, by contrast, the decision to attribute speech
either to the government or to private parties does not necessarily have predictable
constitutional outcomes. That is because both private and public speech enjoy certain
immunities from constitutional restraint. One can toggle back and forth between
these categories and thereby avoid constitutional regulation of the content of speech.
A. Attribution and Constitutional Avoidance
By way of illustration, compare Pleasant Grove City v. Summum9 and Town of
Greece v. Galloway,99 two religious speech cases. In 1971, Pleasant Grove accepted
a privately donated Ten Commandments display from the Fraternal Order of Eagles
that was erected in a local public park."° ' In 2003, the Summum Church offered a
similarly designed display of the Church's Seven Aphorisms to the city, which the
city declined.' The Church argued that the city's selective receipt of the Ten
Commandments monument violated the First Amendment's requirement that
government not pick and choose among speakers to favor in the public square. 
0 2
Under conventional free speech doctrine, the government cannot select among
viewpoints when it is operating a traditional public forum"' 3-in this case, a city
park. The Court, however, determined that the city was not operating a public forum
when it accepted gifts of certain monuments, but was instead engaged in government
speech. 114 Justice Souter, in his concurrence, noted that a reasonable observer would
assume that permanent monuments in public parks are the city's expression.'"
Because the Ten Commandments monument was city speech, it did not have to be
viewpoint neutral.1"' The city was not required to adopt an all-comers policy when
it came to permanent monuments.
The Court took a different position in Town ofGreece v. Galloway."7 That case
involved a challenge to a town's practice of inviting local religious leaders to lead
'7 See Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1,20 -22 (1948), Marsh v. Alabama, 326 U.S. 501 (1946); Jaffe,
supra note 5, at 221; f RISA L. GOI.UBOFF, TitE LoST PROMISE OF CIVIL RitmrTs 260 62 (2007)
(describing early civil rights challengcs to the state action doctrine).
' 555 U.S. 460 (2009).
'" 572 U.S. 565 (2014).
Pleasant Grove City, 555 U.S. at 464 65
id. at 465 66.
2 d. at 464 66.
" Perry Educ. Ass'n v. Perry Local Educators' Ass'n, 460 U.S. 37,45 (1983) ("In places which by
long tradition or by government fiat have been devoted to assembly and debate, the rights of the state to
limit expressive activity are sharply circumscribed.").
4 Pleasant Grove City, 555 U.S. at 471 72.
i hi. at 487 (Souter, J., concurring); see also id. at 471.
'0 See id. at 479 80 (majority opinion); see also Rust v. Sullivan, 500 U.S. 173, 194 (1991) ("To
hold that the Government unconstitutionally discriminates on the basis of viewpoint when it chooses to
fund a program dedicated to advance certain permissible goals, because the progran in advancing those
goals necessarily discourages alternative goals, would render numerous Government programs
constitutionally suspect."); Nat'l Endowment for the Arts v. Finley, 524 U.S. 569, 598 (1998) (Scalia, J,
concurring) ("It is the very business of government to favor and disfavor points of view .")
is7 See 572 U.S. 565 (2014).
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prayers at town council meetings.' The Court held that though the prayers were
often sectarian and predominantly Christian, the prayer practices did not violate the
Establishment Clause. 09 The Court determined that the ministers' prayers were not
government speech, subject to the dictates of the Establishment Clause, even though
the town council had commissioned the prayers and regularly opened their meetings
with them." 0
Legislative prayer is a lacuna in the Establishment Clause. The Court had
previously held that legislatures may commission ministers to pray for the legislators
in their personal and institutional capacities. ' I ' The Court doubled-down on this idea
in Town of Greece, asserting that the city council prayers were meant for the
edification of the town's councilors, were thus "internal" to the council's own
practices, and were therefore not government communications intended to promote
public religiosity." 2 The Court further suggested that the prayers were the private
speech of the ministers who were invited to speak.' As to the latter, Justice
Kennedy's majority opinion observed that it would be constitutionally problematic
for the town to regulate the content of the ministers' religious invocations at all under
principles of free speech and free exercise neutrality."
4 In other words, the
public/private distinction insulated the prayers in Town of Greece from the neutrality
requirements of the Establishment Clause in the same way that the distinction
insulated the speech in Pleasant Grove from the neutrality requirements of the Free
Speech Clause.
Manipulating the public/private distinction is an effective way to restrict the
reach of the First Amendment. If speech is governmental, the government can resist
demands for equal time, even when the government selects speakers, so long as the
government is understood to be the "owner" of the speech. In Walker v. Texas
Division, Sons of Confederate Veterans, for example, which involved a challenge to
Texas's denial of a specialty license plate exhibiting the Confederate battle flag, the
Court was divided 5-4 over whether specialty license plates were government speech
or private speech, with the majority concluding the former."
5 Because the license
plates were government speech-like the monuments in Pleasant Grove-the state
did not have to comply with the demands of viewpoint neutrality. " 
6
In Walker, Justice Alito, the author of the majority opinion in Pleasant Grove
and a member of the majority in Town of Greece, complained in dissent that
government speech doctrine was being used to take a "large and painful bite out of
the First Amendment.""' 7 It is notable that he did not voice the same complaint in
I5 d. at 569 -70.
9 Id. at 573, 591-92.
IS See id. at 569 71, 574-75.
. Marsh v. Chambers, 463 US. 783, 784 85, 792 95 (1983) (holding that the practice of opening
legislative sessions with a prayer did not violate the U.S. Constitution, despite the fact that only Christians
were chosen to participate),
112 Town ofGreece, 572 U.S. at 587- 91.
113 See id. at 583.
14 See id. at 581.
" 135 S. Ct. 2239, 2243 44, 2246 (2015).
6 Id. at 2246.
117 Id. at 2255 (Alito, J., dissenting).
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Pleasant Grove or Town of'Greece, where the decision to categorize speech as public
(in the former)... and private (in the latter)" 9 also limited the reach of the First
Amendment.
Perhaps Alito's views on religious speech influenced his views of the distinction
between public and private speech. 121 Indeed, these cases suggest hat the category
of "government speech" is being dictated by the nature of the speech and less by a
consensus theory of state action. Unsurprisingly, the public/private distinction is
serving a substantive goal.
B. Public and Private Confederate Monuments
The use of the public/private distinction to achieve substantive ends is evident in
the context of Confederate monuments as well. In Memphis, Tennessee, the city
sought to remove statues of Jefferson Davis and Nathan Bedford Forrest (a former
Confederate general and grand wizard of the Ku Klux Klan), 21 but was barred by a
state statute that limits the circumstances under which local governments can remove
war memorials.1 22 That statute only applied to publicly owned statues on public
lands, however.'23 The city thus transferred the statues and the land on which they
sat to a private owner.1 24 The private owner, unrestrained by the state statute,
removed the statues. 1
25
This kind of fonnalism seems a little silly, though the social meaning of an
expressive act may change depending on its attribution. Indeed, maybe the entire
concept of state action is a function of social meaning. The same act-erecting and
maintaining a Confederate monument-has different meanings depending on
whether it is accomplished with public funds on public lands or is completed by
private actors using private funds on private lands. It is certainly the case that a state
statute barring a private citizen from removing her own Confederate memorial would
invite serious First Amendment questions. But why does the same statute not raise
constitutional questions when a city is prevented from doing so? The answer is, of
course, the private/public distinction: municipal corporations are generally not
treated as private speakers. They are the state.
The distinction is regularly deployed, but whether it should hold is an important
question. Consider the case of Birmingham's Confederate memorial, a large obelisk
in, the city's civic center.' 6 The state sued Birmingham, to which Birmingham
1" See Pleasant Grove City v, Summum, 555 U.S 460, 481 (2009).
.. See Town of Greece, 572 U.S. at 588.
12 See Schauer, supra note 34, at 271.
'2' Liliana Segura, Forrest he Butcher: Memphis Want, to Remove a Statue Honoring First Grand Wizard of"
the KKK, INTERCEPt (Sept. 2, 2017, 8:00 AM), https://theintercept.com/2017/091/02/memphis-wants-to-remove-
satue-honoing-kkk-grand-wi7zard-nathan-bedford-forrest/ [https://perma.cc/5WVY-YRY6].
22 Bray, supra note 26, at 27- 30.
23
d at 27 29.
14 1d. at 29 30.
125 id.
26 lan Stewart, Judge Throws Out Alabama Law that Protects Con/ederate Monuments, NPR (Jan.
15. 2019, 5:52 PM), https://www.npr.org/2019/0l/15/685672038/judge- throws- out-alabama-law-that-
protects-confederate-monuments Fhttps://perma.cc/YW 8Z-ZY7C].
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responded by arguing that a state law preventing it from removing the memorial was
a violation of the city's free speech rights.27 Citing Pleasant Grove, the trial judge
agreed, holding that the obelisk was city speech and that Birmingham "has a right to
speak for itself, to say what it wishes, and to select the views that it wants to
express."'128 In Pleasant Grove, recall, the Supreme Court concluded that reasonable
observers would conclude that a permanent Ten Commandments monument in the
middle of a city park was the city's speech.129
In addition to Tennessee and Alabama, a number of other states have adopted
"statue statutes" that are drafted to prevent cities from removing Confederate
monuments and other war memorials.'3" These statutes have been challenged on First
Amendment and equal protection grounds.1 ' As to the First Amendment claim,
normally the public/private distinction would be a barrier to the assertion of a
municipal speech right. The government does not enjoy a "right" to speak, but rather
speaks at the behest of the polity, normally through electoral mechanisms that give
political majorities decision-making power. Moreover, if a city is simply an arm of
the state government, then it cannot assert a claim against the state for a violation of
rights. The city is merely a convenient administrative unit through which the state
exercises its decision to speak or not to speak and in what form. In overturning the
trial judge's decision, the Alabama Supreme Court recited these familiar maxims,
asserting that municipal corporations, as creatures of the state, do not enjoy
constitutional rights.'32
That conclusion is somewhat overstated, however. The Supreme Court has never
definitively held that cities do not enjoy speech rights and some courts have treated
cities as potential First Amendment rights holders.'33 The Pleasant Grove Court did
not hesitate to attribute speech to the city, though it did not say anything about
whether the state could order the city to speak. 13
4 For some commentators, the fact
that profit and non-profit corporations enjoy speech rights suggests that municipal
corporations should as well."' These commentators reject the public/private
distinction as applied to cities, arguing that the values underlying the distinction point
to treating cities just like other corporations or associations, at least for speech
purposes. 136
What kind of analysis should courts undertake in the face of claims of municipal
constitutional right? Acknowledging that the public/private distinction is a
[27 Order on Cross Motions for Summary Judgment at 1, State v. City of Birmingham, No. CV-17-
903426-MGG (Ala. Cir. Ct. Jan. 14, 2019)
1
2
1 Id. at 4- 6.
29 See Pleasant Grove City v. Summum, 555 U.S. 460, 470 71 (2009).
13' Bray, supra note 26, at 23 44.
1
31 
Id. at 17 18.
112 State v. City of Birmingham, No. 1180342,2019 Ala. LEXIS 132, at *6, * 13 (Ala. Nov. 27,2019).
133 See. eg., Creek v. Vill. of Westhaven, 80 F.3d 186, 192 (7th Cir. 1996); Mosdos Chofetz Chaim,
Inc. v. Vill. of Wesley Hills, 701 F. Supp. 2d 568, 598 99 (S.D.N.Y. 2010).
131 Pleasant Grove City, 555 U.S. at 472 73.
131 See Richard C. Schragger, When White Supremacists Invade a City, 104 VA. L. REV. ONLINE 58,
61, 67- 68 (2018) (collecting and describing the literature).
136 See, e.g., Yishai Blank, City Speech, 54 HIARV. CR.-C.L. L. REV. 365, 370-73 (2019); David
Fagundes, State Actors as First Amendment Speakers, 100 Nw. U. L. REV. 1637, 1686 87 (2006).
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conclusion and not a fact about the world would be a good start. As Micah
Schwartzman and I have argued, the "nature" of a given corporate entity does not
tell us anything about whether it should be treated as a rights holder."' The
appropriate approach is to assess the justifications for the attribution of rights in any
given context. 138
Whether a city should be able to assert constitutional rights against he state is a
more complex question than current constitutional doctrine -- which is generally
hostile to the idea-acknowledges. '39 Municipal corporations, in contrast to business
corporations, ended up on the "public" side of the public/private distinction as that
distinction was developed in the early part of the nineteenth century.""' But history
need not be destiny. The general hostility to corporate speech rights suggests that the
constitutional culture is not necessarily comfortable with treating business
corporations as free speech rights holders.'4 ' On the other hand, the Binningham
judge's decision to treat the city as it would any private speaker suggests that these
categories are not foreordained. '42
One need not recognize a municipal speech right, however, to rule on behalf of
municipalities seeking to remove their Confederate monuments in the face of
restrictive state laws. Instead of asking whether a city enjoys a free speech right, one
could instead ask whether it makes sense to call a monument in a city-owned park
that the city would rather remove "government" speech in the first place. If an
expressive act is going to be associated with a city, then the city ought to have some
significant say in what that expressive act is. There should be a minimum nexus
between the government speech and the government speaker.
In other words, instead of thinking of the connection between speech and the city
as a city's speech right, one could instead think of it as a minimum requirement for
treating an expressive act as "government speech." An essential feature of
government speech is that the government that is speaking be the actual speaker. "43
This nexus is necessary because, as the Supreme Court has emphasized, the primary
constraint on government speech is the fact that the government is "accountable to
117 Richard Schragger & Micah Schwartzman, Some Realism about Corporate Rights, in TilE RISE
OF CORPORATE RELIGIOUS LIBERTY 345, 345 46 (Micah Schwartzman et al. eds., 2016).
J
3
8 See id. at 347.
"' See Schragger, supra note 135, at 60 61.
... RICHARD SCHRAGGER, CITY POWER 57 60 (2016); see also HENDRIK tlARTOG, PUBLIC
PROPERTY AND PRIVATE POWER 182 204 (1983); Gerald E. Frug, The City as a Legal Concept, 93 IARV.
L. REV. 1057, 1099 1109 (1980) (discussing the origin and development of the public/private distinction).
'4' Cf Citizens United v. Fed. Election Comm'n, 558 U.S. 310, 348 53 (2010) (holding that
corporations do hold free speech rights, in spite of the Supreme Court's previous jurisprudence which
held that there was a "compelling governmental interest in preventing 'the corrosive and distorting effects
of immense aggregations of wealth that are accumulated with the help of the corporate form and that have
little or no correlation to the public's support for the corporation's political ideas' (quoting Austin v.
Mich. Chamber of Commerce, 494 U S 652, f660 (1990))),
142 See Order on Cross Motions for Summary Judgment at 3, State v. City of Birmingham, No. CV-
17-903426-MGG (Ala. Cir. Ct. Jan. 14, 2019).
141 See Caroline Mala Corbin, Mixed Speech: When Speech is Both Private and Governmental, 83
N.Y.U. L. RIEV. 605, 615 (2008).
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the electorate and the political process for its advocacy."
'144 To enjoy the immunities
that the "government speech" label provides to government speakers, that speech has
to be representative. To require majority black cities like Memphis or Birmingham
to keep their monuments--or Charlottesville, where the statues are a constant
reminder of the violence done to the community-seems a violation of this basic
political principle.45
This applies to official and formal pronouncements-memorials and such. But
what about public officials' rhetoric? Here, too, the public and private get mixed up.
Government speech turns out to be a very muddy category, in part because the
"government" speaks in so many ways. 146 Public officials make statements all the
time that contravene norms of equal treatment or disestablishment and yet the courts
regularly do nothing.14 7 Sometimes standing doctrine is used to shield elected
officials from being hauled into court for the things they say;'
48 sometimes it is the
Court's willful blindness.49
In any case, the judicial hesitance to regulate officials' speech is more a function
of institutional capacity than a considered understanding of what constitutes
"government speech." The courts are simply incapable of policing the rhetoric of
public officials except indirectly. This means that any constitutional constraint on
govermment speech is going to be underenforced.5 ° Even if the courts bar the
government's overtly sectarian, hateful, or exclusionary speech when presented in
the form of a prayer or a monument, they are not likely to regulate the many
statements made by public officials that convey the same message or have similar
exclusionary effects. Donald Trump's statement hat there were "very fine people on
both sides" of the racist violence that occurred in Charlottesville at the Unite the
Right rally is not likely to be remedied by any court.1
5 '
IV. COERCED AND NON-COERCED SPEECII
If a city is a rights bearer, like any other corporation, then forcing it to "speak"
by requiring it to maintain its Confederate monuments is an act of compelled
144 Bd. of Regents of the Univ. of Wis. Sys. v. Southworth, 529 U.S, 217, 235 (2000). A similar
accountability principle is reflected in the Court's federalism decisions, which seek to ensure that citizens
can track the real origins of legislation and appropriately attribute enforcement to the correct level of
government. See, e.g., Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898, 91 8 22 (1997); New York v. United States,
505 U.S. 144, 168 69 (1992).
145 C( Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 633 35 (1996) (striking down a state law preempting local
anti-discrimination ordinances).
146 See Corbin, supra note 143, at 607.
147 See Richard C. Schragger, The Relative Irrelevance of the Establishment Clause, 89 TEX. L. REV.
583, 588 (2011).
141 See Elk Grove Unified Sch. Dist. v. Newdow, 542 U.S. 1, 5, 17 18 (2004); Moore v. Bryant, 853
F.3d 245, 248, 253 (5th Cir. 2017).
149 See Trump v. Ilawaii, 138 S. Ct. 2392, 2416 17, 2423 (2018).
'511 See generally Schragger, supra note 147 (describing how the Establishment Clause is
underenforced). On underenforcement, see Lawrence Gene Sager, Fair Measure: The Legal Status of
Underenjbreed Constitutional Norms, 91 ItARV. L. REV. 1212 (1978).
151 See Steven R. Shapiro, Reflections on Charlottesville, 14 STAN. J. C.R. & C.L. 45, 47-48 (2018),
Neither, it turns out, are his statements denigrating Muslims. See Trump, 138 S. Ct. at 2417 18, 2423.
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speech. But what constitutes "coerced" as opposed to "free" speech? Current
doctrine tends to draw categorical lines. Appropriate government speech includes
cases in which the government engages in expressive activities itself, when it chooses
to selectively fund the expressive activities of non-governmental actors5 2 or when it
places expressive conditions on the receipt of government funds,'5 3 and, finally,
when it compels taxpayers to pay for expressive activities generally. 5 4 Inappropriate
"compelled" speech occurs when the government forces an actor to recite something
she does not believe in or requires her to directly subsidize others' private speech. 5
Despite these rule-like statements of the doctrine, the distinction between coerced
and non-coerced speech continues to be highly contested and contestable. Consider
again Birmingham's First Amendment claim. One argument the city could make is
that local taxpayers should not have to pay for speech with which they disagree. But
this kind of claim is normally unavailing. Generally, outside of the Establishment
Clause, citizens cannot object to the things the government says "in their name" and
for which the government taxes them.' If, however, the city is understood as an
individual or a corporation, then forcing the city qua city to maintain a Confederate
monument looks the same as forcing any other private actor to recite a certain
dogma. '57 Birmingham's citizens can be compelled to fund speech that is anathema
to them, but Birmingham, the corporate entity, cannot.
For those who object to forcing a city to continue maintaining Confederate
monuments, however, these forms of compulsion look pretty similar. Government
speech doctrine draws a line between direct and indirect compulsion and direct and
indirect subsidies. But this distinction has always been fairly brittle.
A. Conscience and Compelled Speech
Consider the Court's rhetoric in the recently decided Janus v. American
Federation of State, County and Municipal Employees.5 ' There, Justice Alito,
writing for a 5-4 majority, held that a state law requiring public employees to pay
dues to a union over the employees' objections violates the compelled speech
doctrine.'59 Alito's statement of the principle could not be clearer: "Compelling
individuals to mouth support for views they find objectionable violates [a] cardinal
constitutional command .... When speech is compelled,..... individuals are coerced
152 Nat'l Endowment for the Arts v. Finley, 524 U.S. 569, 587 88 (1998).
'3 Regan v. Taxation with Representation of Wash., 461 U.S. 540, 544-46 (1983).
151 Johanns v. Livestock Mktg. Ass'n, 544 U.S 550, 559 (2005).
" Janus v. Am. Fed'n of State, Cty., & Mon. Emps., Council 31, 138 S. Ct. 2448, 2463 64 (2018);
see also United States v, United Foods, Inc., 533 U.S 405, 410 11 (2001); Wooley v. Maynard, 430 U.S.
705,714 15 (1977).
"' Micah Schwartzman, Conscience, Speech, and Money, 97 VA. L. REV. 317, 376 80 (2011).
117 Q.Wooley, 430 U.S. at 715 (holding that "[tihe First Amendment protects the ight of individuals to hold a
point of view different from the majority and to refuse to foster.., an idea they find morally objectionable").
"' Janus, 138 S. Ct. 2448.
151 Id. at 2459, 2486.
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into betraying their convictions.'"160 One hears echoes of the Supreme Court's
famous decision in West Virginia State Board of Education v. Barnette, the
compulsory flag salute case.'6 1
And yet the robust conscience claim embraced by the Court in Janus does not
apply at all to taxes, or to specifically targeted fees as long as those taxes and fees
fund the government's own expressive programs. The difference between Janus and
taxes or targeted fees, according to Justice Scalia, is that "[c]ompelled support of a
private association is fundamentally different from compelled support of
government."'16 2 Why that would be the case in light of Alito's compelled speech
principle is unclear. One needs to ask why betraying one's convictions in relation to
the government is different from betraying one's convictions in relation to a private
party; both seem like similar offenses to conscience.' 
63
Another limit on Janus's compelled speech principle is conditional government
funding. Under Rust v. Sullivan, viewpoint-based restrictions that accompany
government funding are effectively legitimate.164 Recall that, in Rust, the Court
dismissed a challenge to a federal statute mandating that government family planning
funds not be used to "encourage, promote[,] or advocate abortion.' 65 The Rust Court
denied that the statute imposed an unconstitutional condition on the receipt of
government aid in violation of the First Amendment.166 The Janus problem,
however, seems present in Rust as well. Is it not the case that the threat of the
withdrawal of government funding inappropriately influences recipients to "betray"
their "convictions" as Alito claims in Janus?
67
These cases are all overwrought. The compelled speech principle stated in Janus
is overstated; so is the too-easy dismissal of the compelled speech claim in Rust. And
the distinction that Justice Scalia draws between compelled support of government
and compelled support of private speakers cannot possibly be doing the necessary
work.
Consider a similar claim in the Establishment Clause context. In opposing a
Virginia plan that would impose a government collected tax to pay for clergy,
Thomas Jefferson famously declared that "to compel a man to furnish contributions
of money for the propagation of opinions which he disbelieves and abhors, is sinful
and tyrannical."'6t This "Jeffersonian proposition"'69 is the original statement of
160 Id. at 2463 64; see also Schwartzman, supra note 156, at 318 21 (discussing the "Jeffersonian
proposition" that the Establishment Clause prohibits taxation designed to promote religion on the grounds
that such taxation infringes on taxpayers' freedom of conscience).
16' 319 US. 624, 642 (1943).
162 Johanns v. Livestock Mktg. Ass'n, 544 US. 550, 559 (2005) (quoting Abood v. Detroit Bd. of
Educ., 431 U.S. 209, 259 n.13 (1977) (Powell, J., concurring)),
163 Cf Schwartzman, supra note 156, at 325 26.
164 500 U.S. 173, 193 (1991).
165 Id. at 180,
"
1
' Id. at 196 97.
1 7 Janus v. Am. Fed'n ofState, Cty., & Mun. Emps., Council 31, 138 S. Ct. 2448, 2464 (2018) (Alito,
J., concurring).
",6 Thomas Jefferson, A Bill Ibr Establishing Religious Freedom, in 2 TIE PAPFRS OF TIOMAS
JFFFFRSON 545, 545 (Julian P. Boyd ed., 1950) (footnote omitted).
169 Schwartzman, supra note 156, at 319.
Vol. 108
WHAT IS "GOVERNMENT" "SPEECItI"?
Justice Alito's compelled speech principle.7 ' And yet, the Court, including Justice
Alito, has permitted (and, in a number of cases, required) 71 the government to fund
religious speakers and institutions even as those speakers and institutions advocate
positions that are anathema to those paying the bill.' 7 2 Here we see the collapse of
the principle before it even gets off the ground.
Two things seem to be going on. The first is what Micah Schwartzman calls the
"anarchy objection"' 3 -the worry that government "could not function" if
conscientious objectors could refuse to pay taxes that might be used to fund the
government's expressive activities.174 The second seems to be an objection to
redistributive government arrangements, like compulsory union dues, that implicate
speech.'75 This may be why, as to the latter, Justice Kagan accuses the majority in
Janus of "weaponizing" the First Amendment to attack laws that regulate an
economic act-the paying of union dues in the context of municipal
employment-that is only tangentially related to speech.17 6 For Kagan, the use of
compelled speech doctrine to undercut a long-standing and embedded feature of
labor law is a form of Lochnerism.' 
77
These cases of compelled support raise numerous important questions. In the first
instance, does the paying of money constitute an expressive or conscientious act, as
Alito and Jefferson contend?'7' Does government funding always mean that the
government "owns" the speech, and therefore can dictate its content?179 Can an
individual or community distance themselves from expressive conduct by not
participating in government programs that violate their conscientious
commitments?8 1 How far does such a principle go?
Answering these difficult questions would require a great deal more room than
this short Article allows. The general point is that there is nothing simple about
drawing a distinction between coerced and non-coerced speech. At stake in these
cases is the content of the substantive principle. The justices disagree not only about
the appropriate categorization but also about the scope and application of the
individual right.
"7 Janus, 138 S. Ct. at 2464.
171 See e.g., Trinity Lutheran Church v. Comer, 137 S. Ct. 2012, 2024 (2017).
172 See Rosenberger v. Rector & Visitors of Univ. ofVa., 515 U.S. 819, 845 46 (1995).
"' Schwartzman, supra note 156, at 323.
171 United States v. Lee, 455 U.S 252, 260 (1982) (rejecting a religious exemption from Social
Security taxes on the ground that "[t]he tax system could not function if denominations were allowed to
challenge the tax system because tax payments were spent in a manner that violates their religious belief').
11 Janus, 138 S. Ct. at 2459-61; see also Burwell v. I-lobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 573 U.S. 682,
688 92 (2014) (holding that compulsory health insurance coverage requiring contraception violates the
corporation's freedom to exercise religion).
176 Janus, 138 S. Ct. at 2501 (Kagan, J., dissenting).
177 set id. at 2498; see also Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45, 75 76 (1905) (Holmes, J., dissenting)
(arguing that the Constitution, and especially the concept of liberty in the Fourteenth Amendment, "is not
intended to embody a particular economic theory").
175 See Janus, 138 S. Ct. at 2463 04 (majority opinion); Schwartzman, supra note 156, at 360.
171 See Rust v. Sullivan, 500 U.S. 173, 193 (1991).
... See Burwell, 573 U.S. at 716.
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B. Are There Non-coercive Expressive Activities that the State Cannot Engage in?
In Confederate monuments cases, issues of attribution and compulsion tend to
recede, supplanted by the broader question of whether there are simply things that
the government cannot say. Compelled or not, the government's expressive activities
might be impermissible.
For this reason, those advocating constitutional limitations on government
expressive conduct find resources in Establishment Clause doctrine. I have already
mentioned the non-endorsement principle, which holds that when government
speaks it may not "send[] a message to nonadherents that they are outsiders, not full
members of the political community, and an accompanying message to adherents
that they are insiders, favored members of the political community."'
81 Nelson Tebbe
has sought to generalize this principle beyond the context in which Justice O'Connor
first articulated it.'82 Tebbe has argued that an expressive equal treatment principle
is implicit in doctrinal areas beyond the Establishment Clause.'
83
In Establishment Clause cases themselves, however, the non-endorsement
doctrine is mostly moribund. In American Legion v. American Humanist
Association, the Court recently upheld the constitutionality of a thirty-two-foot tall
Latin cross memorializing soldiers killed in World War I that had stood in
Bladensburg, Maryland since 1925.84 In doing so, the Court refused to apply the
endorsement test; indeed, it appeared to reject all of the existing Establishment
Clause tests at least as applied to symbolic government communications.
8 5 Instead,
the Court adopted a presumption of constitutionality for all long-standing
government religious practices. 
8 6
Some number of justices are inclined to go further and hold that government
religious speech can never be constitutionally actionable when it is not accompanied
by coercion. Under a coercion test, the government is only constitutionally liable if
the government compels citizens to engage in a religious ritual or practice.'
8 7 Passive
monuments or practices would never be unconstitutional under this standard.
Justice Gorsuch argues for this approach in his American Legion concurrence.'
88
He asserts that "offended observer" standing in Establishment Clause cases is an
anomaly in the law, and that it should be eliminated. 
89 He points out that those
asserting racially based expressive harms are normally barred from bringing claims,
"' Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668, 688 (1984) (O'Connor, J., concurring).
182 Id.; Tebbe, supra note 78, at 659 60; see generally Schwartzman, supra note 63 (theorizing how
religion may or may not be afforded special treatment by the Constitution).
183 See Tebbe, supra note 78, at 693 -96; see also Schragger, supra note 87, at 21 22.
114 139 S. Ct. 2067, 2074, 2077 (2019).
15 See id. at 2087 89.
1'6' See id. at 2089 90.
I d. at 2093 (Kavanaugh, J., concurring); id. at 2095 (Thomas, J., concurring).
[ td. at 2098 2100, 2103 (Gorsuch, J., concurring).
"9 ld. at2102 03.
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but those asserting religiously based ones are not, and he finds that disparity
troubling.'90 Gorsuch would eliminate offended observer standing in all cases. 91
Gorsuch's concurrence represents the "sticks and stones" position.9 2 The
coercion test assumes, as a general matter, that the government's symbolic
expression is less harmful than its conduct. But again, the distinction between speech
and conduct already embeds a value judgment. If the harms from some kinds of
expressive conduct are significant, why draw a categorical line?
So, too, what constitutes coercion is, of course, disputed. School prayer with an
opt-out for dissenters technically does not coerce elementary and secondary school
children to pray, even if, as a matter of social reality, the exercise by a student of the
opt-out might result in significant stigma. Justice Kennedy took the position that
prayer in school was inherently coercive but that prayer in a city council chamber
was not.'93 The concept of coercion can be even more capacious, however. Some
have argued that government funding of public schools might unduly coerce parents
who would rather send their children to private, parochial schools. 194 Free exercise
neutrality, on this account, would require equivalent funding for religious education.
Here again, a substantive account of what government neutrality requires in
relation to a given right is doing the necessary work, not a relevant distinction
between coercive and non-coercive government action. If one agrees that the Equal
Protection Clause should protect against the government's racially hateful speech in
the same way that the Establishment Clause protects against religiously hateful
speech, then coercion is beside the point. Justice Gorsuch would "level down" by
eliminating offended observer standing under the Establishment Clause.'95 But why
not "level up" and allow those with colorable claims of discriminatory state
expression under the Equal Protection Clause bring those claims as well?
V. EXPRESSIVE EQUAL TREATMENT?
What does the application of a general expressive equal treatment principle look
like?9 ' Justice Kagan's dissent in Town of Greece suggests a possible model.
197
Recall that, in Town of Greece, the Court upheld a town's practice of opening its
council meetings with sectarian, mainly Christian, prayers.9 8 Attendees in the town
"" Id. at 2099.
'9' Id. at 2098.
92 See Schragger, supra note 87, at 8 9 (citing Doff, supra note 70, at 1284 86).
Compare Lee v. Weisman, 505 U.S. 577, 592 (1992) (holding that prayer in public schools carries
an indirect risk of coercion), with Town of Greece v. Galloway, 572 U.S. 565, 586 87, 591 92 (2014)
(holding that prayer at town board meeting was not coercive).
194 For a discussion, see Nomi Maya Stolrenbcrg, "lie Drew a Circle that Shut Me Out":
Assimilation, Indoctrination, and the Paradox al a Liberal Education, 106 HARV. L. Rtv. 581,590 & n.37
(1993).
195 See Am. Legion, 139 S. Ct. at 2100 (Gorsuch, J., concurring). But see Schragger & Schwartzman,
supra note 35, at 34 36.
9 See Schragger, supra note 87, at 21 31.
117 Town of Greece, 572 U.S. at 615 31 (Kagan, J., dissenting).
.. Id. at 569 71 (majority opinion).
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are not required to stand or pray under penalty of law, nor are they required to
otherwise participate in the religious ceremony.199
Nevertheless, Justice Kagan argues in her dissent that the town's prayer practices
are themselves an expressive wrong.200 In so doing, she explicitly rejects the
majority's line drawing between public and private.0
1 She also implicitly rejects the
majority's speech/conduct and coerced/non-coerced istinctions.
2
1
2 According to
Kagan, the Town of Greece's prayer practices are forms of government action that
are both harmful and potentially coercive.20 3
A. The Equal Citizenship Principle
It is worth taking a closer look at Kagan's argument. Kagan starts by noting that
the Constitution does not only embrace the freedom to worship as one chooses, but
also a principle of equal citizenship.2°4 As Justice Kagan asserts:
A Christian, a Jew, a Muslim (and so forth)--each stands in the same relationship
with her country, with her state and local communities, and with every level and
body of government. So that when each person performs the duties or seeks the
benefits of citizenship, she does so not as an adherent to one or another religion,
but simply as an American.
2
11
Sectarian religious speech that is integrated into a quintessential government act-a
town council meeting-betrays that individual and collective identity.
"And so a civic function of some kind brings religious differences to the fore: That
public proceeding becomes (whether intentionally or not) an instrument for dividing
her from adherents to the community's majority religion, and for altering the very
nature of her relationship with her government.
206
Kagan further worries that this symbolic and expressive dividing will be
accompanied by certain kinds of harms. What if a judge starts a trial by asking those
present to stand while a minister blesses the proceedings in sectarian terms, or an
election official asks a minister to say a benediction before the opening of the polls,
or a presiding officer in a naturalization ceremony has a minister invoke Christ before
administering the oath for new citizens?207 These prayer practices would be
problematic, Kagan asserts, both because they violate the equal citizenship principle
and also because the person coming before the government in these instances would
feel pressure to comply, because "[a]fter all, she wants, very badly, what the judge
or poll worker or immigration official has to offer.1
208 Once put to the choice, the
'
99
1 d, at 588 89.
2' Id at 631 33 (Kagan, J., dissenting).
201 See id. at 634 36.
212 See id. at 621- 23, 630 -31.
20
3 Id. at 620- 21, 630 31.
114 Id, at 615, 632 33,637.
21 Id. at 615.
106 M. at 621.
207 Id. at 617 18.
201 Id. at 620.
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person who opts not to participate, "must make known her dissent from the common
religious view, and place herself apart from other citizens, as well as from the
officials responsible for the invocations.211 9 The implication is that in addition to
marking herself as "other," she will receive less favorable treatment from
government officials and her fellow citizens.
In other words, the social meaning of the government's prayer practices is such
that it alters the fundamental relationship of equal concern and respect required of
the state. It alters the citizen's identity before the law, placing her in a position of
coming to the law clothed with a disfavored status.210 Those prayer practices may
also force her to identify herself as a religious minority and may cause government
officials or other citizens to act differently toward those who are so identified.
The government's expressive practices are wrong in two ways. First, there are
the harms caused by expressive activity in altering the behavior of citizens and
officials. Second, there is the wrong of the social message of inequality,21' regardless
of its material effects.
B. Equal Citizenship and Confederate Monuments
Now consider these principles as applied to Confederate monuments or other
Confederate iconography. One might look to the original animating purposes of the
monuments as well as to their present-day message.
As to the purpose, the historical record is quite clear. The American Historical
Association has asserted that the Confederate monuments erected in the twentieth
century were "part and parcel of the initiation of legally mandated segregation and
widespread disenfranchisement across the South.1212 These monuments "were
intended, in part, to obscure the terrorism required to overthrow Reconstruction, and
to intimidate African-Americans politically and isolate them from the mainstream of
public life." ' 2' 3 When black rights consciousness appeared to threaten white
supremacy, Southern whites sought to assert their political dominance
unequivocally. That message was received. The New National Era, an
African-American newspaper edited by Frederick Douglass, called the first wave of
monuments to the "lost cause" "monuments of folly," which would only create a
"needless record of stupidity and wrong" and serve no purpose except to
"cultivat[e] hatred."214 The newspaper was right.
Statues and memorials to the "Lost Cause" were not predominantly erected in
out-of-the-way places, in quiet cemeteries, or battlefields. Instead, they were placed
in front of courthouses, city halls, libraries, schools, in central squares, and along the
2I, ld. at 621.
See id. at 630-32.
Slellman, supra note 88, at 27; Schragger, supra note 87, at 4.
212 AM. HISTORICAL ASS'N, AIA Statement on Coniederate Monuments, PERSP. ON I IIST. (Oct. 1, 2017),
https://www.historians.org/publications-and-directories/pespctives-on-history/october-201 7/aha-statement-on-
confederate-monuments [https://perma.cc/9GQS-BQPG].
213 w.
214 Monuments '?!f Folv, NEW NAT'L ERA, Dec. 1, 1870,
https://chroniclingamefica.loc.gov/tccrnsn84026753/1870-12-01/ed-l/seq-3/ [https://perma.cc/NM2M-73K6]; see
also Bray, supra note 26, at 10.
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cities' main boulevards. This monument building was not incidental to the
segregated South. In Charlottesville, the Lee statue was built in the whites-only Lee
Park, opposite the whites-only library and just up the street from the whites-only
elementary school.2 15 In the lead up to the dedication of the Lee statue, the Ku Klux
Klan held a cross-burning.2 16 The Klan's subsequent march through the town drew a
large crowd and positive reviews from the local newspaper.217 Across the South,
bomb-throwings and lynchings were commonplace means of terrorizing black
citizens. Monuments were only one way in which whites inscribed their dominance
into the political landscape, but they were an important way.
2 ' 8
Do Confederate statues continue to convey a message of unequal citizenship
status? For those aware of the history of Confederate iconography-and awareness
has certainly grown in recent years -the message is fairly clear. Consider the
African-American citizen who is required to pass a statue of a Confederate soldier
standing guard underneath a Confederate battle flag as she walks into a courthouse
or city hall.219 Certainly, a reasonable observer with some knowledge of context
22 °
would experience that statue as a signal of second-class tatus, a reminder that the
institutions of state and local government still do not truly represent all people.
To be sure, meanings change. Some motivations recede and others take their
place.2 In the Bladensburg Cross case, Justice Alito observes that crosses had
become secular symbols of the World War I dead, and that the present-day meaning
of the cross had changed over time.
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But meanings can change in a less politically inclusive direction as well. In a
post-civil rights regime, perhaps Confederate monuments are just statues of old
soldiers, historic relics of little import. Or, alternatively, maybe the more recent
embrace of Confederate monuments by white supremacists colors the objective
social meaning of Confederate monuments today. I think it is fair to say that many
people viewed Confederate statues differently after the violence in Charlottesville
and elsewhere. In some cases, those changed meanings have induced local officials
to remove those monumnents, in the places where they have the power.
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WI IAT IS "GOVERNMENT" "SPEECH1"?
That political response seems appropriate. Government expressive acts that are
animated by and continue to convey a message of racial exclusion should fall under
a robust equal protection principle. But even within the doctrinal contours of the
government speech doctrine, government speech that is a product of a deeply flawed
political process should be constitutionally problematic. As the Court has stated, the
ultimate check on government speech is that it is responsive to political oversight.
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At a minimum, government speech is legitimate to the extent that it is representative.
The Confederate monuments erected uring the Jim Crow era, however, are the
very antithesis of representative. They were erected when African-Americans were
disenfranchised, in places that purposefully segregated them from the political,
economic, and social life of the community.225 So too, it is anti-democratic when one
political community forces another one to continue speaking in that same anti-
democratic register, as states are doing when they force local governments to keep
their monuments. Doing so constitutes a form of political and symbolic
domination22 6 and it arguably violates the minimal representativeness requirement
for legitimate government speech.
CONCLUSION
The doctrinal category of "government speech" does not theorize its own limits.
When deployed as a conclusion, the category hides the distinctions on which it is
constructed-between speech and conduct, public and private, and coercive and
non-coercive government activity. The lines courts draw within those binaries are
contested.
This is evidenced by recent controversies over Confederate monuments. There is
no categorical reason why Confederate iconography should not be subject to the
same tests of constitutionality that are applied to other forms of government conduct.
Nor is there a good reason to treat municipal speech as if it were simply attributable
to the state, when it is obviously the speech of a different and unique political
community. And, finally, it is insufficient to assert that the government's speech can
do no harm because it does not coerce. Words often harm as much or more than
"sticks and stones." Government symbolic activities that have constitutionally
detrimental effects or that convey a constitutionally inappropriate message should be
subject to constitutional limits.227
Those limits could be external to the government speech doctrine--the
Establishment Clause in cases of religious speech and the Equal Protection Clause
in cases of racial speech. But there is also a constraint internal to the doctrine.
Legitimate government speech must be, by definition, representative. If it is the result
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of a political process that systematically disfavors and targets out-groups, it is
illegitimate. The government speech doctrine should not protect it.
Denoting an expressive activity as "government speech" thus far mostly limits
constitutional oversight of the government's exclusionary expressive conduct.
Unearthing the assumptions embraced by the doctrine, however, reveals a different
possibility: that the govermnent speech doctrine could be used to constrain hateful
government speech instead. Government speech doctrine can embody an ideal of
expressive equal treatment, or at least a concept of representative speech. When a
legitimately democratic regime determines to stop speaking in the register of an
illegitimate one, we should call that progress.
